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ON LEADING A HORSE TO WATER: 
NEPA AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 
Roger C. Cramton* and Richard K. Berg** 
J. INTRODUCTION 
T HE process of change in complex social organizations is itself a highly complex phenomenon, and governmental agencies are 
not exempt from this general rule. Presidents and administrators 
may come and go, but the civil service-with its inherited policies, 
attitudes, and biases-is with us always.1 Moreover, the process by 
which governmental decision makers gather information, consider 
alternatives, and balance conflicting values may have characteristics 
that are highly persistent over time. While it is desirable to over-
come unnecessary bureaucratic rigidities, any attempt to improve 
this decision-making process must take into account some important 
practical limitations. 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)2 pro-
vides a relatively successful case study of the possibilities, methods, 
and limitations on the process of change as applied to agencies of the 
federal government. NEPA was intended to make federal agencies 
more responsive to environmental considerations and values, which 
had been too frequently neglected in governmental decision-making. 
In the short time since its enactment, the Act has produced, in addi-
tion to a number of judicial victories that have been celebrated by 
• Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of 
Justice. Formerly, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States. Professor 
of Law, University of Michigan (on leave). A.B. 1950, Harvard University; J.D. 1955, 
University of Chicago.-Ed. This Article was prepared prior to the assumption of 
duties at the Department of Justice. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Department . 
.. Executive Secretary, Administrative Conference of the United States. A.B. 1951, 
Harvard University; LL.B. 1954, Yale University.-Ed. 
This Article was originally prepared for delivery to the ABA-ALI Course of Study 
on Environmental Law II at the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., on Febru-
ary 17, 1972. A portion of its contents has been published in Cramton & Berg, Enforc-
ing the National Environmental Policy Act in Federal Agencies, 18 PAAc. I.Aw., May 
1972, at 79. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Barry B. Boyer in the prepa-
ration of this Article. 
I. The difficulties experienced in trying to change the habits and practices of the 
federal bureaucracy were concisely expressed by President Truman. Commenting upon 
the forthcoming inauguration of General Eisenhower, he said, "He'll sit there • • • 
and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that.' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit 
like the Army." s. OP0TOWSKY, THE KENNEDY GOVERNMENT 27 (1961). 
2. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
[ 511] 
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environmentalists,3 a dramatic change in the perspectives of a num-
ber of federal agencies.4 Even more change-the steady sure change 
that results from building new inputs, values, and arguments into 
the decision-making process-is around the corner. 
Skepticism concerning the ability of government to respond to 
changed social attitudes and policies is widespread today. This is an 
age in which any governmental success story needs to be recognized, 
emphasized, and given currency. Thus, it is important to chronicle 
the success of NEPA as an example of the possibility of orderly social 
change. There may be lessons in this experience that reformers can 
put to use in other contexts. 
But success is not without its dangers. Only the naive or zealous 
will perceive necessary and desirable change as cost-free and without 
negative side effects; NEPA is no exception. Although the experience 
thus far has been a healthy and successful one, there is danger that 
the spirit will be undermined-in some agencies-by a mere observ-
ance of form that fails to grapple with the underlying realities. Simi-
larly, judicial zeal that interprets NEPA as imposing a detailed pro-
cedural code or as requiring the impossible of federal decision 
makers will frustrate effective regulation by the federal government 
at a time when vigorous regulation is badly needed. You can lead a 
horse to water, but it is more difficult to force him to drink; and even 
if he does, too much of a good thing is sometimes harmful. 
This Article is concerned with the effect of NEPA on adminis-
trative decision-making. What benefits has NEPA conferred on us? 
What dangers have emerged? What questions remain to be clarified 
if NEP A's benefits are to be achieved while minimizing any negative 
side effects? 
In many respects, NEPA resembles a constitutional charter.5 It 
3. Some of the outstanding landmarks have been: Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (environmental impact statement must 
consider all "reasonably available" alternatives, including those beyond the agency's 
own authority); Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th 
Cir. 1972) (work on segment of interstate highway halted pending preparation of an 
environmental impact statement although highway project was in progress prior to 
effective date of NEPA); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm,, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (AEC rules governing consideration of environmental issues and 
relying on water quality standards set by other agencies held invalid under NEPA). 
4. Insiders conversant with the Washington scene agree that the AEC and the 
Army Corps of Engineers have undergone a dramatic transformation since enactment 
of NEPA. Significant changes in the manner and substance of decision-making in the 
Departments of Defense, Interior, and Transportation have also been noted. 
5. Hanks &: Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and NEPA., 
24 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 230 (1970): "In form, the National Environmental Policy Act is a 
statute; in spirit a constitution. • • • In sum, it does not seem farfetched to suggest 
that the .•• Act could well become our Environmental Bill of Rights." 
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states a general policy in lofty terms, outlines a fragmentary proce-
dure for implementing that policy, and leaves questions of detail to 
the good sense of those who must live with and interpret its require-
ments. The Congress did not attempt to anticipate the administra-
tive adaptation that would be required in applying the Act to the 
enormously varied activities of the federal government. Not a line, 
not even a word, is addressed to the transitional problem of applying 
NEP A's requirements to governmental actions that were virtually 
completed or long in motion at the time of enactment-situations in 
which it is obvious that commitments have been made that can be 
reopened only to a limited degree.6 
The National Environmental Policy Act declares that 
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use 
all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to 
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain con-
ditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements · 
of present and future generations of Am.ericans.7 
The Act goes on to amplify somewhat this none-too-precise statement, 
and, in particular, sets out certain procedures that federal agencies 
must employ to achieve the goals of the statute. The most significant 
and controversial of these procedural demands is the requirement 
of section 102(2)(C) that each agency prepare, in connection with 
each major action "significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment," a so-called "environmental impact statement" that 
must be available to other interested federal, state, and local agencies 
and to the public, and must "accompany the proposal through the 
existing agency review processes."8 From this mandate that the state-
ment accompany the proposal through the review process, the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which is given certain general 
6. NEPA has been broadly applied to federal actions initiated prior to its effective 
date of January I, 1970. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1119-22 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Note, Retroactive Application of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 69 MICH. L. REY. 732 (1971). The note of caution im-
plicit in section 11 of the guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental Quality, 
36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7727 (1971), which requires agencies to shape further action in 
projects commenced prior to 1970 so as to minimize adverse environmental conse-
quences, has not always been fully reflected in the decisions. 
Although NEPA immediately imposed an increased burden on federal agencies, no 
additional funds were provided. Existing personnel have been required to shoulder the 
extra burdens, or new personnel have been hired by diverting funds for that purpose. 
Because of the lag in the budgeting and appropriations process, the fiscal year that 
began on July I, 1972, offered the first opportunity for most agencies to obtain new 
resources for handling the burdens necessitated by NEPA. 
7. NEPA § IOl(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970). 
8. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
514 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:511 
responsibilities in the administration of the Act,9 has inferred the 
concept of the "draft impact statement," which must be circulated 
and made public for comment prior to the final agency decision.10 
Three years have now passed since enactment of NEPA, and the 
sky, despite a multitude of doom-sayers, has not fallen. Environ-
mental impact statements relating to nearly 3,000 agency actions had 
been filed with the CEQ as of May 31, 1972, and new statements are 
being received at the rate of about five per day.11 In the first two 
years under the Act, NEPA generated forty-seven district court deci-
sions, fifteen circuit court decisions, and three Supreme Court dis-
sents, all involving judicial review of administrative actions.12 
The experience under NEPA is now sufficient to permit a retro-
spective appraisal as well as a modest peek at the uncertain world 
that lies ahead. Our assessment is that the beneficial aspects of NEPA 
easily outweigh the limited negative effects, although the latter may 
increase if reviewing courts treat the NEPA requirements as either 
highly detailed, inflexible mandates or as all-purpose tools for re-
versing agency actions with which they have a policy disagreement. 
II. BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF NEPA 
The beneficial aspects of NEPA are large in magnitude and 
relatively clear in nature. 
First, NEPA is an important step in a national reordering of 
priorities. For the first time, Congress has declared that federal agen-
cies must consider environmental values along with other relevant 
factors in making decisions. The isolation and parochialism that 
characterize some governmental agencies-the tendency to be totally 
absorbed in the agency's special mission or with its special constit-
uencies-are partially displaced. The agency must now take a larger 
view of its functions, placing them in the broader perspective of 
"the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential conditions of 
9. NEPA directs agencies to consult with the CEQ concerning methods of ensuring 
that environmental values will be considered (§ 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970)) 
and to assist the CEQ (§ 102(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1970)); and the CEQ is di-
rected to review and appraise federal programs in light of NEP A's policy and to make 
recommendations to the President. Moreover, Exec. Order No. 11514, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 528 
(1972), assigns the CEQ important functions in coordinating activities under NEPA and 
issuing guidelines for compliance with it. 
IO. The nature and content of the draft environmental impact statement are de• 
scribed in section 9(b) of the CEQ guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7726 (1971). 
11. 1972 ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 247. 
12. Information supplied to authors by Frederick R. Anderson, Editor, Environ• 
mental Law Reporter, Washington, D.C. More than 200 suits have been filed under 
NEPA. 1972 ANN, REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENv!RONMENTAL QUALITY 249. 
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national policy," to avoid degradation of the environment, to pre-
serve "historic, cultural, and natural" resources, and to obtain "the 
widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without . . . un-
desirable and unintended consequences."13 
Second, NEPA requires an "airing" of the issues involved in gov-
ernmental decision-making. It opens formerly closed administrative 
procedures to public view and to public comment. This is especially 
true, of course, of those decisions relating to use and management 
of public property, where there are not, by and large, any statutory 
requirements for public hearings or other structured procedures for 
obtaining outside views and expertise. The opening or closing of 
defense installations,14 storage and transportation of nerve gas,15 and 
underground explosion of nuclear devices16 are merely examples 
of the many administrative actions that are now exposed to public 
scrutiny prior to the occurrence of the event because of NEP A's 
requirements. 
Third, NEPA forces agencies to articulate and to explain their 
decisions. Agencies must not only invite and listen to outside com-
ments, but they must in practice respond to such comments. If it is 
charged that a certain environmental damage is threatened by a 
given project, the environmental impact statement cannot safely 
ignore that assertion. The impact statement must either explain why 
the agency discounts the threat or why the benefits of the proposed 
project are believed to outweigh the dangers.17 The requirement 
that agencies examine outside comments and consider them care-
fully is likely to result in more thoughtful and informed decision-
making. 
Fourth, NEPA contains a built-in mechanism for leading the 
bureaucratic horses to environmental waters. While in theory an 
agency can draft an impact statement on the basis of a narrow pro-
gram-oriented perspective and leave it to other agencies to supply 
the required "interdisciplinary approach"18 in their comments, it 
13. NEPA § IOI(b), 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b) (1970). 
14. E.g., State Comm. To Stop Sanguine v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Wis. 1970). 
Cf. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972). 
15. See, e.g., McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971). 
16. The AEC's Amchitka Island weapons test inspired a number of appellate opin-
ions involving environmental effects and public access to records bearing on the en-
vironmental problems. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 3 
BNA ENV. REP. CAS. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 3 BNA ENV. REP. CAS. 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
3 BNA ENv. REP. CAS. 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1971), motion for injunction denied, 404 U.S. 917 
(1971); Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), revd., 41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S., Jan. 22, 
1973). 
17. Lathan v. Volpe, 2 ENV. L. REP. 20545 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
18. NEPA § 102(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1970). 
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seems unlikely that an agency would permit a proposal to get as far 
as the circulation of a draft statement without having pinpointed 
and considered the principal environmental objections that might 
be raised. To anticipate environmental implications adequately, 
many agencies are being forced to acquire new personnel with spe-
cialized training in environmental sciences; when these staff mem-
bers are brought into the planning of projects at an early stage, the 
planning process will acquire a broader perspective. In time, the 
agency will develop an institutional viewpoint more sympathetic to 
environmental, as opposed to purely programmatic, values. 
Admittedly, this is largely a prediction rather than an assessment 
of the present state of administrative decision-making. The agencies 
must guard against a natural but unfortunate tendency to permit the 
writing of impact statements to become a form of bureaucratic 
gamesmanship, in which newly acquired expertise is devoted not so 
much to formulating a project that meets the needs of the en-
vironment as to shaping an impact statement to meet the contours 
of the agency's preconceived program and to withstand the test of 
judicial review. 
A great virtue of NEP A's requirements is that they build into 
the bureaucracy an instrument for orderly social change. Bureau-
cratic organizations that have had an effective program of any kind 
almost invariably develop a set of attitudes and belief patterns that 
enormously influence what they do.19 The personnel of the agency 
have undergone common experiences, they often share a common 
professional training, and they have devoted their careers to efforts 
premised on certain valued assumptions. Thus, a civil engineer who 
has devoted the better part of a lifetime to building new highways 
as quickly and cheaply as possible to meet the transportation de-
mands of a generation of Americans is threatened when his basic 
premises are attacked. Were his efforts wasteful or harmful? The 
ability of any group of professionals to react positively to criticism 
of this sort is limited. Anger, defensiveness, and stubborn resistance 
are more likely reactions. 
Under NEPA, however, an agency that attempts to grapple mean-
ingfully with environmental issues is forced to recruit a new phalanx 
of professionals with values and perspectives different from its old-
line operatives. As the new personnel react with the old, new sets of 
shared attitudes and goals may replace those that had hardened into 
the bureaucratic structure. Thus, NEPA is a window to the outside 
19. See, e.g., E. REDFORD, THE REGULATORY PROCESS 22-38 (1969). 
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world; it brings outside comments into the decision-making process 
and, through the infusion of new personnel, it introduces new per-
spectives to the agency. 
Finally, NEPA is not a toothless tiger that can be ignored when-
ever it suits the convenience of a federal agency. The citizen suit 
provides an extraordinarily flexible and effective enforcement tech-
nique, at least against administrative agencies.20 The courts have 
been vigilant-perhaps even too vigilant-in implementing the 
NEPA requirements. In recent years, the courts have broadened the 
citizen's right to bring suit and the scope of court review of adminis-
trative actions.21 The willingness of the courts to vindicate environ-
mental values means that governmental agencies must take seriously 
the NEPA obligation to consider environmental factors and the 
views of outsiders. Industry counsel, knowing that citizen groups 
are likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from reviewing courts, 
are encouraged to assist agencies in giving proper consideration to 
environmental values. Otherwise, industry will suffer from costly 
delays resulting from judicial reversal of the decisions of an overly 
acquiescent agency. Awareness of the ready availability of judicial 
enforcement of NEPA is likely to lead to cooperative enforcement 
of the law by agencies and industry representatives. 
III. THE DANGERS OF EXCESSIVE ZEAL IN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF NEPA 
Initial reflection on this statutory framework leads one to ask, 
"Why is there so much fuss about NEPA?" The policies set forth in 
NEPA seem worthy enough, if not platitudinous. Cautious inclu-
sion of terms such as "practicable,"22 "appropriate,"23 and "to the 
20. See 1971 ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 155-70, for a 
discussion of the citizen suit. 
21. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), a recent environmental case not 
involving NEPA, the Court held that the Sierra Club lacked standing to contest the 
Forest Service's approval of a plan to construct a ski resort on national forest lands in 
the Mineral King Valley because the Club had failed to allege that it or its members 
would suffer injury in fact as a result of the proposed development. However, the Court 
did not question that threats to scenic, ecological, historical, or aesthetic interests could 
constitute sufficient "injury in fact" to confer standing under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 405 U.S. at 734, and concluded that once standing was established, the 
plaintiff would be able to assert nonpersonal "interests of the general public" in sup-
port of his claim, 405 U.S. at 740 n.15. See also Association of Data Proc. Serv. Orgs., 
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 
F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy 
v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, 
Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
22. NEPA §§ IOI(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 433l(a)-(b) (1970). 
23. NEPA §§ 102 (B), (E), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332 (B), (E) (1970). 
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fullest extent possible"24 suggests that the agencies have substantial 
discretion in administering the provisions. And the requirements for 
the drafting and circulation of impact statements, for solicitation of 
comments and the coordination of expertise, seem at first blush to 
be no more than the implementation of a directive to the agencies: 
"Before you make a major decision, think; think about what it is 
you are doing!" 
Yet, federal agencies appear to be encountering severe difficulties 
in complying with NEPA as it is being construed by reviewing 
courts. The current travails of agency decision makers, in our view, 
cannot be ascribed wholly to their lethargy or perverseness; some 
part of the problem may be traced to a discrepancy between the 
nature of the decision-making process as envisioned by NEPA (or, 
more accurately, NEPA plus its judicial gloss) and the decision-
making process as it actually occurs within a governmental agency 
or any other bureaucratic organization. 
A. Uncertainties in the Meaning and Application of NEPA 
I. Application of the Impact Statement Requirement 
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires "all agencies of the Federal 
Government" to "include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment"25 a detailed 
environmental impact statement. NEPA, as Judge Friendly has 
said, is "a relatively new statute so broad, yet opaque, that it will 
take even longer than usual fully to comprehend its import."26 
Already, however, it is apparent that "major" means "any" and 
that "significantly affecting" means "affecting." Indeed, some de-
cisions indicate that the agency bears the burden of showing that 
the proposed action does not meet these tests and must issue an 
impact statement "whenever the action arguably will have an 
adverse environmental impact."27 Given the subjective quality of 
the Act's qualifying language and the breadth with which the 
courts have interpreted it, the issuance of environmental impact 
24. NEPA§ 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
26. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
27. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F. 
Supp. 189, 201 (D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis original). See also 346 F. Supp. at 199. Another 
case holds that even the threshold determination of environmental impact requires 
affirmative steps to develop an administrative record and, in effect, a "mini-impact 
statement." Hanly v. Kleindienst, 31 An. L.2d 922 (2d Cir., Dec. 5, 1972). 
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statements promises to become a routine occurrence in many areas 
of public administration. 
Thus, it is difficult to imagine any action in the energy field so 
inconsequential that an impact statement would not be required.28 
Since abandonment or certification of transportation facilities is 
likely to affect the volume of total traffic or the share held by motor 
vehicles, a wide range of actions by transportation agencies is also 
subject to the environmental statement requirement.29 Thus far 
only a few functions, notably the issuance of price orders under 
the Emergency Stabilization Act,30 have been held exempt from the 
impact statement requirement. Even in the few cases in which an 
action of extremely limited environmental significance is con-
templated, such as a short-term military landing exercise involving 
900 Marines in a state park commonly visited by as many as 6,000 
persons per day in the summer months, the searching nature of 
the judicial inquiry ensures that environmental issues will be 
adequately protected.31 
28. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3184 (U.S., Oct. 3, 1972) (FPC certificate for construction of an 
electric transmission line); Wilderness Soc. v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970), 
revd., Nos. 72-1796, 72-1797 & 72-1798 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 9, 1973) (Interior Department 
permits for the Alaskan pipeline and its related road haul). 
29. In City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), Judge 
Friendly held that the ICC erred in failing to prepare an environmental statement in 
connection with the abandonment of 1.8 miles of a terminal rail line in the New York 
City area, since abandonment of the rail line would affect the environment by increas-
ing truck traffic. Similarly, it has been held that the ICC erred by failing to prepare an 
adequate environmental impact statement when approving a rail rate increase affecting 
the relative costs of transporting recyclable and primary materials. See text accompany-
ing notes 49-53 infra. The same or similar arguments are applicable to many licensing 
and rate proceedings in transportation agencies. One recent case, however, holds that a 
decision allowing a rate to go into effect without suspension and investigation is not 
subject to the NEPA requirements. Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451 
F.2d 783 {2d Cir. 1971). Construction projects in metropolitan areas that threaten to 
increase the burden on transportation facilities may also be subject to the impact state-
ment requirement. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (construction of 
jail and office facilities in New York City). 
30. Cohen v. Price Commn., 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The case arose on 
a motion for a preliminary injunction against a fare increase, and thus the opinion 
does not constitute a final determination on the applicability of NEPA to the Price 
Commission. However, the language and reasoning of the court's opinion strongly point 
to the conclusion that NEPA is inapplicable. 
31. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972). The De-
fense Department in this case made elaborate preparations for the landing exercise, and 
the agreement with park authorities reflected environmental concerns, including a re-
quirement that vehicles would be confined to existing roads. John Nolan, a Washington 
attorney, has wryly commented that, if the arrangements had provided for a smaller 
complement of chemical toilets, the decision might well have gone the other way. Re-
marks delivered at the ABA-ALI Course of Study on Environmental I.aw II at the 
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., Feb. 17, 1972. 
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2. Substantive Effect 
One area of considerable uncertainty is how NEPA operates to 
affect the decisional equation in each agency. There is no question 
that NEPA requires decision-making procedures that will permit 
agencies to take environmental values into account. But what 
weight is to be given to such values when they conflict with the 
values expressed or implicit in the statute the agency is administer-
ing? Section 105 of NEPA simply states that the policies and goals 
of NEPA are "supplementary" to those set forth in the agencies' 
existing authorizations,32 thus providing little practical guidance. 
A case in point is Zabel v. Tabb,33 in which the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit upheld the refusal of the Army Corps of 
Engineers to grant a dredging permit, when such refusal was based 
on ecological grounds. The applicants for the permit had argued 
that the Corps could refuse such a permit only when the dredging 
would represent an obstruction to navigation.34 The court rejected 
this contention, basing its conclusion, in part, on NEP A.35 The 
Zabel case has been interpreted to mean that "NEPA serves to aid 
Federal agencies which, in the absence of NEPA might be forced 
to operate under mandates arguably incompatible with environ-
mentally responsible decisionmaking."36 
While the result in Zabel appears correct, we are not certain 
that every agency that presently has statutory authority to exercise 
some measure of discretion in a matter involving private rights or 
interests is now empowered to consider environmental factors as 
well as those factors relevant under the agency's basic statute. 
Ordinarily, when an agency is granted discretionary authority, that 
discretion is to be exercised within certain limits and for the ac-
complishment of certain statutory purposes. These limitations on 
agency action provide a focus for agency programs and a check on 
arbitrariness. They should not lightly be set aside or diluted. 
Let us take an extreme example. Under the Securities Act of 
1933,37 most investment securities may not be sold to the general 
public until a registration statement conforming to the require-
ments of the Securities Act is filed with the SEC and in effect. A 
32. 42 u.s.c. § 4335 (1970). 
33. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 
34. 430 F .2d at 203. 
35. 430 F.2d at 211·13. 
36. Remarks of Timothy B. Atkeson, General Counsel, CEQ, reprinted at 118 CONG. 
REc. El626, 1628 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972). 
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970). 
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registration statement takes effect twenty days after filing, but the 
Commission may, in its discretion, accelerate the effective date and 
ordinarily does so when it is satisfied that the statement affords 
adequate disclosure to prospective investors.38 The dynamics of the 
securities market are such that a failure to obtain acceleration is 
quite likely to frustrate the entire offering. Does NEPA permit or 
require the SEC, in deciding whether or not to accelerate effective-
ness of a corporation's proposal to sell stock to finance expansion, to 
take into account the environmental effects of the issuer's plans for 
expansion? Or, to give another example, may the Internal Revenue 
Service refuse to give a tax ruling on a proposed transaction on the 
ground that the transaction will have adverse environmental effects? 
If the Service refuses to give the ruling, the transaction may be 
abandoned as too risky, and the Internal Revenue Code seldom 
purports to distinguish between taxpayers on the basis of a trans-
action's environmental effects.39 
NEPA, in our view, is not directed at these situations. It should 
not be interpreted as granting to every federal agency a roving com-
mission to defend the environment wherever its writ runs, ir-
respective of the nature of the subject matter before it. 
Some distinctions are necessary. One of the difficulties in dealing 
with NEPA is that it appears to have been drafted to deal with one 
type of administrative decision, the big federal or federally financed 
project, where the government's discretion to go forward or to 
refrain from doing so is substantially unlimited. NEPA should be 
applied with caution to governmental programs that regulate what 
are essentially private activities. Government, of course, cannot be 
indifferent to the environmental effects of private action. Regu-
lation of such action, however, is best accomplished by agencies 
specifically empowered to do so on a general basis, and not through 
a hit-or-miss system by which agencies impose conditions or restric-
tions extraneous to the statutory programs they are charged with 
administering. 
3. Legislative Proposals 
With all this ferment, it is paradoxical that the environmental 
impact statement has had virtually no effect as yet on the legislative 
process.40 The notice-and-comment procedures envisioned by NEPA 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77(fl.) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1972). 
39. But cf. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 169. 
40. Section 102(c) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), provides that all agencies of the 
federal government shall include an impact statement in "every recommendation or 
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seem peculiarly well-adapted to public airing and discussion of 
issues raised by major legislative proposals. Furthermore, Congress 
is much less restricted than particular agencies in the alternatives 
that it can consider and act upon. Yet, fewer than two hundred 
environmental impact statements have been filed in connection 
with legislative proposals,41 and many of them have involved recent 
Administration proposals to improve the environment-a category 
of legislation that is hardly the central concern of NEPA. Surely 
among the thousands of bills introduced in Congress and the 
hundreds enacted during the past three years, there have been a great 
many that have had or would have had substantial and adverse effects 
on the environment. One reaches the reluctant conclusion that 
NEPA has been virtually a dead letter in this respect. Congress 
appears to be considering and enacting legislation even though 
federal agencies have not prepared and filed the required statements. 
The failure of Congress to observe the NEPA requirements when 
its own affairs are involved cannot but give comfort to those agency 
officials who are disinclined to take NEPA seriously. 
The problem with respect to NEP A's application to legislative 
proposals is, of course, the unavailability of an effective enforce-
ment mechanism. The broadened scope of judicial review at the 
behest of the citizen group has become accepted as a matter of 
course when agency action is under attack, but no court to date 
has had the temerity to enjoin legislation as to which an environ-
mental impact statement was not filed or to enjoin Congress from 
considering a bill when the NEPA requirements have not been met. 
Any effort to do so would run the risk of a constitutional crisis; 
thus, only Congress can enforce NEP A's application to legislative 
proposals.42 
report on proposals for legislation ••• significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment." The general statement in the text should be viewed in light of the fact 
that congressional debate on a number of important public issues-such as the super-
sonic transport, the Amchitka underground nuclear test, and various public works 
projects-has focused on environmental impact statements prepared by the concerned 
agencies. 
41. According to information supplied to the authors by the CEQ staff, 163 impact 
statements on legislative proposals had been filed as of November 30, 1972. 
42. The Senate Committee on Public Works, apparently alone among congressional 
committees, has adopted a rule that it will not consider a legislative proposal unless 
an environmental statement has been filed. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 
F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), indicates that continuing projects may run into NEPA 
difficulties despite long-standing congressional support. In this case, the TV A was en-
joined from completing the Tellico Dam project for which Congress had appropriated 
funds in 1966 and which had been under construction since early 1967. 
Another relevant case, Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, No. 1029-
71 (D.D.C., filed May 25, 1971), is currently pending. Plaintiffs are seeking to compel 
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4. Actions Subject to Rule-Making Procedures 
Because NEPA has not had a substantial effect on the legislative 
process, its primary application has been to (I) administrative 
actions that fall within the "rule making" or "adjudication" pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A)43 and (2) in-
formal administrative actions that are not subject to these provisions 
of the APA. 
The general effect of NEPA in opening up to public scrutiny 
many informal administrative functions that previously were not 
subject to any procedural requirements has already been mentioned. 
In essence, NEPA imposes a notice-and-comment rule-making 
procedure on informal administrative actions whatever their quality 
or character. Although there are serious uncertainties concerning 
whether or not any given agency action is subject to the NEPA 
requirements, and, if so, what the impact statement must include, 
the simple notice-and-comment procedure of the kind envisioned 
by the CEQ guidelines may be applied without undue strain to 
informal administrative actions. Obviously, where agency actions 
are already subject to the notice-and-comment rule-making proce-
dures of the AP A, there should be no difficulty in complying with 
the essentially similar requirements of NEPA within the framework 
of existing procedures. 
5. Decisions Made After a Trial-Type Hearing 
The application of NEPA, however, to administrative decisions 
that are required to be made on the basis of a record (whether 
"rule making" or "adjudication" as defined in the AP A) raises more 
serious questions, in large part because NEPA provides that the 
environmental impact statement "shall accompany the [agency's] 
proposal through the existing agency review processes."44 This re-
quirement fails to reflect the variety and complexity of trial-type 
proceedings. Three recent federal court opinions-Calvert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC,45 Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Morton,46 and Greene County Planning Board v. 
the AEC to file an environmental impact statement in connection with its request for 
congressional authorization and appropriation for the development of the liquid-metal 
fast breeder reactor as a source of electric power. See l ENV. L. REP. 65153-54 (1971). 
43. 5 u.s.c. §§ 553-54 (1970). 
44. NEPA§ 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). 
45. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
46. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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FPC47-when read together, suggest the possibility of a hair-splitting 
literalism in applying NEPA that is reminiscent of the technicalities 
of common law pleading. Most of the worrisome language in these 
opinions is dicta, however, and, it is hoped, will not be applied in 
cases involving different fact situations. But the direction of some 
judicial thinking is sufficiently troublesome to warrant a word of 
caution. 
In Greene County, which involved a Federal Power Commission 
proceeding for certification of a short transmission line connecting 
an existing pumped storage facility to another part of the utility's 
distribution system, intervenors opposing certification of the line 
on environmental grounds challenged the failure of the Commission 
staff to prepare and circulate its own draft environmental impact 
statement prior to the evidentiary hearing on the application. The 
utility had, as required by FPC rules, submitted a proposed en-
vironmental impact statement in support of its application. While 
the FPC's rules in effect at the time required the Commission staff 
to prepare its own draft impact statement in uncontested cases, the 
procedure in contested cases was for the staff to review the ap-
plicant's statement as to sufficiency of form and to circulate it for 
comment to other interested agencies, but not to prepare a draft 
statement prior to the hearing. The court held that the agency 
could not accept the utility's proposed statement as the draft en-
vironmental statement that must be made available prior to the 
hearing.48 The agency staff must draft its own statement whether 
or not the issues to be canvassed at the formal hearing are fully 
revealed in the applicant's statement. 
This result seems questionable. While it is doubtless appropriate 
to place a burden on the agency to consider and prepare its own 
final environmental statement, the question prior to the hearing 
should be viewed as one of adequate notice to other governmental 
agencies and potential intervenors. NEPA is not intended to re-
structure the agency decision-making process. NEPA takes the 
agency review process as it finds it and simply requires that the 
environmental statement accompany the proposal through that 
process. If that process is one in which the proposal originates out-
side the agency and in which the staff may assume a neutral posture 
or even not participate at all-as in many ICC proceedings-why 
is not a draft statement from the proponent of the action sufficient? 
No satisfactory answer to this question can be found in the 
47. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. !1184 (U.S., Oct. !I, 1972). 
48. 455 F.2d at 421-22. 
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Greene County opinion, or in the similar decision in Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States.49 The 
SCRAP case involved an ICC decision allowing rates affecting the 
shipment of recyclable materials to become effective for a limited 
period of time. The court concluded that the carriers' "self-serving" 
analysis of environmental impact could not be an adequate basis 
for the ICC action150 and that "the Commission's own investigative 
apparatus" must be used "to uncover possible environmental effects 
of the action."51 While the holding in this case is distinguishable 
from Greene County in that it was based upon the inadequacy of 
the agency's final impact statement rather than the draft statement,52 
the cases are similar in demanding of the agency staff independent 
and active consideration of the environmental issues at every stage 
of the proceeding. This attitude is also reflected in the court's state-
ment, made in response to the ICC's contention that the procedures 
mandated by NEPA are too slow and cumbersome to apply to 
temporary rate increases, that the Commission had not satisfied 
its "heavy burden of proof" in attempting to show that full com-
pliance with NEPA was impossible.53 
The Calvert Cliffs' case, taken in conjunction with Greene 
County, may be read to suggest that a mandatory hearing must be 
held in a license or certificate proceeding even though the staff and 
the parties are in full agreement that no environmental issues are 
presented and there are no intervenors who seek to contest the ap-
plication on environmental grounds. Thus, Judge Wright's opinion 
in Calvert Cliffs' states that in "uncontested hearings" the agency 
must give careful examination to the draft statement to determine 
whether staff review has been adequate, and "it must independently 
consider the final balance among conflicting values that is struck 
in the staff's recommendation."54 It must be emphasized, however, 
that Calvert Cliffs' involved the Atomic Energy Act, a statute that 
provides for a mandatory hearing before a license to construct a 
power plant is issued.55 Consequently, it is doubtful that the court 
49. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972). 
50. 346 F. Supp. at 193 n.4. 
51. 346 F. Supp. at 194.95 n.8. 
52. The portions of the opinion discussing the adequacy of ICC draft impact state-
ments and the role of the staff relate to agency decisions which were held to be either 
moot or not ripe for review; however, the opinion as a whole reflects basic agreement 
with the Greene County approach. 
53. 346 F. Supp. at 199. 
54. 449 F.2d at HIS. 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970). 
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intended to imply that a hearing is required on uncontested en-
vironmental issues when, under the agency's practice, a hearing 
would not be required on other uncontested issues. 
When agency procedures provide for hearings on contested 
issues, what kind of dispute is necessary to force a hearing on en-
vironmental issues? Here, Calvert Cliffs' casts a long shadow. There 
is, after all, little that man can do to his environment that would 
be regarded by all as an unalloyed benefit. It is hard to imagine 
construction of any utility plant or facility that would not involve 
some environmental minuses, at least on aesthetic grounds. Thus, 
the action of a federal agency in approving such construction will 
typically, almost invariably, involve acceptance of a trade-off: power 
for scenery, air pollution, radiation, or what have you. What hap-
pens when an environmentalist does not dispute the basic data put 
forward in the utility's proposal or environmental statement, but 
disagrees as to the agency's ultimate decision? Or, perhaps, the en-
vironmentalist urges consideration of an alternative. Can he force a 
hearing? 
The cases have not yet answered this question, but if one takes 
as a point of departure the views of Judge Wright that "all possible 
environmental factors [must be included] in the decisional equa-
tion" in order to achieve "a rather finely tuned and 'systematic' 
balancing analysis in each instance,"56 and that "[c]onsiderations 
of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not suffice 
to strip [section 102 of NEPA] of its fundamental importance,"57 
then any objecting party with a spark of imagination should be 
able to force a full evidentiary hearing. Yet, surely there is a need 
for flexibility here. One does not need a scale to determine that an 
elephant weighs more than a horse. Agencies should be permitted to 
require some sort of threshold showing by environmentalists that 
the balance on a particular proposal is likely to be reasonably close 
and to turn on disputed questions of fact before a hearing becomes 
mandatory. After all, trials are expensive and time-consuming, and, 
at best, an imperfect tool for reaching value judgments with respect 
to environmental issues. However elaborate the decisional process, 
the principal ingredients cannot really be reduced to a common 
denominator. Even the most finely tuned and systematic balancing 
analysis must rely in large part on factors that defy precise measure-
ment. 
It seems ironic that a statute designed to produce a rational 
56. 449 F.2d at 1113. 
57. 449 F.2d at 1115. 
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agency decision-making process, in which competing values are 
balanced in a considered fashion, should itself be interpreted to 
contain requirements that cannot be balanced against opposing 
considerations such as "administrative difficulty, delay or economic 
cost." Yet this is the view of NEPA one finds in the Calvert Cliffs' 
and Greene County opinions, a view only partially qualified in 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton. In this last case, 
Judge Leventhal concluded that NEPA's requirement that al-
ternatives be discussed must be interpreted under a "rule of 
reason."58 One might further hope that reasonableness will also 
hold sway in assessing the procedures employed by agencies in 
applying the NEPA requirements to the highly variegated adminis-
trative universe.59 
B. Disadvantages of Requiring an Unrealistic Exploration 
of Consequences and Alternatives 
In Calvert Cliffs', the District of Columbia Circuit rebuffed an 
attempt by the AEC to simplify its environmental decision-making 
in nuclear plant license proceedings by adopting a rule foreclosing 
consideration of the effects of thermal pollution on water quality 
if the proposed discharges would not violate the water quality 
standards administered by the state in which the plant was to be 
operated and were approved by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). The rule was struck down, not merely because the 
court felt it represented an abdication to the state agency of the 
AEC's NEPA responsibility, but, more significantly, because the 
court read NEPA to require "a case-by-case balancing judgment"60 
by federal agencies. Judge Wright stated: 
In each individual case, the particular economic and technical bene-
fits of planned action must be assessed and then weighed against 
58. 458 F.2d at 834. 
59. A recent decision on remand of the Natural Resources Defense Council case to 
the district court suggests an even further refinement for those who wish to adopt the 
strategy of delay. When an agency amends a draft environmental statement to discuss 
issues not previously considered, the ninety-day period provided by the CEQ guidelines 
for notice-and-comment to other governmental agencies and members of the public 
runs anew. In common law pleading terms, the variance is fatal and the exhausted 
pleader must start afresh, as the Secretary of Interior then did. Secretary Morton, how-
ever, was not content with his fate. The newspapers carried stories of his "bitter dis-
appointment" over court decisions that have delayed governmental programs aimed at 
developing natural resources and have tended, in his view, to shift governmental re-
sponsibilities from executive departments to the judiciary "where the criteria and un-
derstanding so requisite for fundamental resource decisions do not exist." Washington 
Evening Star, Feb. 10, 1972, at A-3. 
60. 449 F.2d at 1123, 
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the environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which 
would affect the balance of values. The magnitude of possible bene-
fits and possible costs may lie anywhere on a broad spectrum . . .. 
The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that, 
with possible alterations, the optimally beneficial action is finally 
taken.61 
While, in theory, it may be desirable for each governmental decision 
having a significant environmental impact to be reached after 
thorough exploration of the consequences and individualized balanc-
ing among all available alternatives, such a requirement imposes a 
great and perhaps intolerable strain on the decision-making process. 
The decision-making process involved in these cases is exceed-
ingly complicated.62 Typically, it involves trade-offs among values, 
many of them impossible to quantify. Perhaps air or water pollution 
can be decreased through a change in plant design involving con-
siderable additional costs. Perhaps decreased water pollution can be 
accomplished at the expense of greater air pollution, or vice versa. 
Quite possibly, objectionable pollution is unavoidable unless a 
different site is selected. Perhaps the project can be substantially 
altered or abandoned entirely. Each of these choices brings different 
consequences in its train. 
Any decision maker must attempt to reduce his more com-
plicated decisions to manageable size. Usually Congress helps by 
providing directives or policy guidance in statutes governing specific 
programs. For example, statutory directives do not require the De-
partment of Agriculture to recalculate the long-range effects of vari-
ous crop support programs before deciding the allowable acreage in 
a given year. The Department of Transportation, unfortunately in 
our view, is not free to decide that we have enough highways and 
therefore the highway trust fund should be spent for something else. 
Agency administrators, through regulations, directives, and the like, 
attempt to guide future implementation of their programs, not 
merely to inform and to instruct their less enlightened subordinates, 
but to enable the business of the agency to go forward without an 
endless re-examination of first principles. NEPA does not, of course, 
explicitly require such a continuous re-examination of first principles. 
What it does do, in the view of Judge Wright in Calvert Cliffs', is 
require a consideration of alternatives as part of an "individualized 
balancing analysis [leading to an] optimally beneficial action."63 
61. 449 F .2d at 1123. 
62. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving 
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L R.Ev. 111 (1972). 
63. 449 F.2d at 1123. 
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But when program values are viewed as in constant and fluid com-
petition with environmental values, first principles can never be 
very firmly established. 
Certainly, analysis of the environmental impact of a proposal 
must involve consideration and evaluation of alternatives. But to 
select among alternatives, one must be able to measure their relative 
merits in terms of some standard or objective, the validity of which 
is assumed. Such a standard or objective represents in itself a choice 
among alternatives that has presumably been made at an anterior 
point in time, perhaps at a higher governmental level, on the basis 
of another and more general norm. 
For example, what is the range of alternatives that the AEC 
should consider in the context of a particular licensing proceeding?64 
Clearly, the desirability of particular design changes in the plant 
should be investigated. Possibly it would be useful to evaluate 
alternative sites for the plant in the same general area. Should the 
AEC also consider whether the locality would be better off environ-
mentally with a fossil fuel plant? If so, should it consider the en-
vironmental disadvantages of oil spills or strip mining where the 
fuel is produced? Should the AEC consider whether it would be 
preferable to provide power by transmission from other areas or 
even whether the community should do without the additional 
power capacity? The Calvert Cliffs' opinion does not discuss at any 
length what range of alternatives the AEC must consider, since that 
question was not before the court. But an outgrowth of that de-
cision may be to encourage public intervenors in AEC licensing 
proceedings to raise issues related to the merits of alternative sites or 
to the technical feasibility of available alternative sources of power 
-a development that could lead to a geometric increase in the 
factual questions to be resolved in each proceeding.65 
This question regarding alternatives presents particular diffi.-
64. See Cramton, Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 585 (1972), for a brief discussion of current procedural problems in AEC licensing 
and regulation. 
65. See generally Murphy, The National Environmental Policy A.ct and the Licens-
ing Process: .Magna Carta or Coup de Grace?, 72 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 963 (1972). The Greene 
County case requires that issues discussed in the draft environmental statement be 
open for testimony and cross-examination at the hearing: 
[WJe deem it essential that the Commission's staff should prepare a detailed state-
ment before the Presiding Examiner issues his initial decision. Moreover, the in-
tervenors must have a reasonable opportunity to comment on the statement. But, 
since the statement may well go to waste unless it is subject to the full scrutiny or 
the hearing process, we also believe that the intervenors must be given the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine both [utility] and Commission witnesses in light of the 
statement •••• 
455 F.2d at 422, 
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culties when, as in the AEC situation, agency action is required to 
be taken only after a formal trial-type proceeding. As long as the 
agency procedure is informal and managerial in nature, the agency 
can control to a great degree the extent to which alternatives are 
explored, can rely on other agency evaluations, and can terminate 
an inquiry when it appears that the alternative is unlikely to prove 
feasible. In a formal trial-type proceeding with adversary parties, 
it is extremely difficult for the presiding officer to limit evidence or 
questioning regarding available alternatives and their environ-
mental consequences. Nor can complicated issues be broken down 
easily into subunits and resolved separately. Indeed, as a protection 
against judicial review, an officer conducting a formal hearing is 
generally well advised to permit the parties to get anything they 
desire into the record even though the end result is more data than 
any human mind can comprehend. 
The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton adds a new dimension 
to the problem of alternatives. In that case, the court held that the 
Interior Department's impact statement, filed in connection with a 
proposal for a sale of offshore oil and gas leases, was deficient be-
cause it failed to consider adequately the possibility of eliminating 
oil import quotas as a means of supplying needed fuel. While con-
ceding that NEPA required only the consideration of "reasonably 
available"66 alternatives, the court rejected the government's con-
tention that "availability" is measured by the authority of the 
agency in question to put the alternative into effect.67 This approach 
goes well beyond Calvert Cliffs' and in one respect contradicts it. 
In Calvert Cliffs', the court emphasized that the impact statement 
must not merely "accompany" the proposal through the agency 
process, but rather must actually be taken into account in agency 
decision-making.68 Natural Resources Defense Council, however, 
apparently envisages a discussion of alternatives that are beyond the 
power of the decision maker to effect. 69 
66. 458 F .2d at 834. 
67. 458 F.2d at 835. 
68. 449 F.2d at 1117-18. 
69. Alternatives that an agency is powerless to adopt may, of course, serve as a 
basis for a refusal to act. But can the AEC, for example, which is charged by statute 
with the duty to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy, refuse to license nuclear 
power plants on the ground that the Interior Department should supply the needed 
energy by expanded off-shore oil leasing, or that the states should abandon oil pro• 
rationing, or that the President and Congress should eliminate the oil import quota 
program? Would not such a decision be viewed as a grave dereliction of duty? The 
absence of a national energy policy and an all-powerful agency to administer it cannot 
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We must bear in mind the inherent limitations on the capacity 
of a complex bureaucracy to explore alternatives. In arguing for 
the necessity of making decisions through successive limited com-
parisons-the "science of muddling through"70-Charles Lindblom 
has written: 
Nothing would be more paralyzing to an administrator than to take 
seriously the prescription ... that he make no decision until he 
[has canvassed] all possible alternative ways of reaching well formu-
lated goals, making sure that he has investigated every possible 
alternative. He can only "get a little outside" his regular routine by 
practicing some strategy that gives him some direction without 
asking for the impossible. 71 
Proposals for agency action generally filter up from below or 
from the field; they are, and must be, shaped primarily by known 
statutory and programmatic goals. In some situations, such as license 
applications, the request or proposal is not even initiated by the 
agency itself, and the agency may have no authority either to compel 
acceptance of an alternative or to ensure approval by another govern-
mental authority. 
The requirement of considering alternatives raises another 
problem that goes to the heart of the NEPA structure. One of the 
basic rationales for the broad delegation of discretionary authority 
to administrative agencies is their presumed expertise. This pre-
sumption may be a legal fiction to some extent,72 but there is 
certainly validity to the proposition that agencies can make more 
informed judgments with respect to subjects with which they 
regularly deal than with respect to subjects beyond their experience. 
Yet, in considering the range of alternatives, the agencies have been 
thrust into areas beyond their specialized knowledge. It is true that 
they may look to more expert agencies for assistance and advice, but 
the final decision, the task of individualized case-by-case balancing, 
rests with the agency responsible for the proposed action. It may 
well be argued that prior to NEPA agencies were constantly making 
be viewed by one agency as an excuse for not pursuing the narrower mandate that 
Congress has given the agency. NEPA does not mandate what can only be viewed as 
"government by impasse." 
70. See Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", in READINGS ON MODERN 
ORGANIZATIONS 154 (A. Etzioni ed. 1969) [hereinafter READINGS]. 
71. Contexts for Change and Strategy: A Reply, in READINGS, supra note 70, at 172. 
72. Cf. Chief Judge Bazelon's comment in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971), to the effect that courts should not 
be "taken in" by the supposed "expertise" of agencies, which may confuse expertise 
with policy or use it in the service of special interests. 
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decisions with consequences they were ill-equipped to foresee or 
evaluate, and that NEPA at least focuses efforts in the right direc-
tion. The problem is probably manageable enough in the context 
of informal procedures. However, difficulties are foreseeable in 
formal proceedings where agency comments must presumably be 
tested by the rules of evidence.73 
We have pointed out before that NEP A:s basic approach is to 
take the agency decision-making process as it finds it, and essentially 
to require that environmental considerations be factored into agency 
determinations in whatever forum and at whatever level they are 
raised. Many of the difficulties we have considered here seem trace-
able, at least in part, to NEP A's tacit and, we suggest, over-optimistic 
assumption that existing decision-making processes are, in a sense, 
elastic and can be stretched to accommodate the infusion of new 
and complex issues without losing their essential character. But 
agency modes of decision-making are not devised in a vacuum. For 
the most part, they are designed to be responsive to the kinds of 
issues the agency is called upon to resolve. If there is a dramatic 
change in the number and the nature of the issues to be resolved, as 
has happened since the enactment of NEPA, it cannot be assumed 
that the old modes of decision-making can easily be adapted to 
handle the new subject matter. 
Nowhere is this point more evident than in trial-type hearings. 
Such proceedings work best when issues are few and narrowly de-
fined, ideally when the proceeding is intended to ascertain the facts 
to which previously announced principles of law or policy will be 
applied. Procedures in many agencies, of course, departed from this 
ideal long before the enactment of NEPA, and complaints are nu-
merous of the rambling formlessness of hearings when voluminous 
questions of fact, law, and policy are sought to be resolved in a single 
proceeding. 
Our point is that ·trial-type hearings and, perhaps to a lesser ex-
tent, the more informal modes of bureaucratic decision-making are 
generally designed to apply settled principles to situations differing 
only marginally from those previously encountered. Such modes of 
73. In Greene County the court stated that the FPC could not "fulfill the demand• 
ing standard of 'careful and informed decisionmaking' [of NEPA if it] can disregard 
impending plans for further power development .••. [W]e cannot tolerate the Com• 
mission cutting back on its expanded responsibility by blinding itself to potential de• 
velopments notwithstanding its lack of authority to compel future, alternate construe• 
tion." 455 F.2d at 424. If evidence and cross-examination must be allowed on issues, 
even though they are not within the power of the agency, the hearing in fact will be 
devoted to issues that are irrelevant in the fundamental sense that the agency cannot 
act upon them (except by denying the application). 
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"incremental" decision-making are frequently ill suited for resolv-
ing such cosmic issues as those with which NEPA is forcing the agen-
cies to grapple. 
Some basic rethinking of program goals and their environmental 
effects is in order, as well as some basic restructuring of the govern-
mental apparatus to achieve better coordination of these goals. It 
may well be that new formats for decision-making need to be de-
vised, but this rethinking and restructuring cannot be accomplished 
by judicial fiat and cannot come all at once. In the meantime, society 
must be prepared to accept those ordinary decisional processes that 
operate within fairly narrow ranges of alternatives. • 
Finally, attention needs to be given to the reference in Calvert 
Cliffs' to the goal of selecting "the optimally beneficial action." Per-
haps too much should not be made of this language.u Everyone 
would agree that a major goal of NEPA is to provide a procedure 
that permits agencies to make more informed decisions as to "op-
timally beneficial action," and it may be that the court meant to 
suggest no more than that. It would be a mistake, however, for the 
courts to regard NEPA as a mandate to the agencies to act in each 
case in strict accord with the scientific method and the dictates of 
pure reason. We would do well to recall the French saying, "The 
best is the enemy of the good." Any administrator knows that to be 
able to act with full knowledge of the available alternatives and their 
consequences is an unobtainable luxury. Usually he must act with-
out any great confidence that his choice is the "optimally beneficial" 
one, and perhaps even with no more than an intuition that his selec-
tion is marginally better than continued inaction. 
It is inevitable in our political system that many significant de-
cisions will represent compromises of one kind or another. These 
compromises will reflect not only a balancing of rational values, but 
frequently the vectors of contending forces. We do not believe that 
NEPA requires decisions on federal projects or expenditures to be 
made without regard for the views of influential congressmen, the 
power of contending interests, and the intensity of feeling of consti-
tuent groups.711 NEPA, in short, does not inaugurate the reign of the 
74. Yet the phrase appears twice in the opinion: "most intelligent, optimally bene-
ficial decision," 449 F.2d at 1114, and "optimally beneficial action," 449 F.2d at 112!1. 
75. While administrative agencies should be required to give reasons for their actions 
and cannot make choices that are whimsical or violative of constitutional standards, 
their policy conclusions may properly contain large elements of intuition, popular 
emotion, or prudent compromise. This is particularly true when Congress has failed 
to place the decision-making process in a judicial mold by reqniring that it be made 
"on the record after opportunity for a hearing." Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). In a democ-
racy, the policy choices reached by political institutions cannot invariably be disinter-
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philosopher-king; it would be wrong and ultimately futile to hold 
the agencies to such a standard. 
IV. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION UNDER NEPA 
An important and much disputed issue is the extent to which 
the judiciary should be relied upon for major decisions of environ-
mental policy. The traditional formulas of judicial review limit a 
court's role to consideration of questions of law, abuse of discretion, 
or lack of adequate evidence. Thus, administrative action taken in 
violation of a procedural requirement must be reversed and re-
manded for further proceedings. An agency must demonstrate that a 
novel and important policy or program is within its legislative au-
thorization. If a decision is taken on the basis of a record, the agency's 
conclusion must find a reasoned basis in substantial evidence re-
vealed in the light of the whole record. The tasks imposed on the 
judiciary by these formulas are not wooden or limited, but require 
the utmost of wise and creative judgment. 
We do not believe, however, that it is the function of a review-
ing court to balance the conflicting values that have been placed by 
the legislature in the hands of administrators. While we are all aware 
of the fashionable theories that administrative agencies are either 
captives of those whom they regulate or wedded to the promotional 
missions that led to their creation, 76 it is neither sound theory nor 
prudent practice to place primary reliance on the judiciary to super-
vise governmental action in the environmental field. The courts 
may occasionally preserve the status quo in instances where improper 
agency action threatens to disturb it, but administrative agencies are 
needed to provide the motive power for necessary alterations of the 
status quo. 
The American experience suggests that agencies and administra-
tors are capable of effective action; indeed, even the alteration of the 
American environment of which environmentalists complain is due 
in part to the efficient efforts of administrators pursuing other mis-
sions. Effective action to preserve and protect environmental values, 
such as the design and administration of a rational system of pollu-
tion standards or charges, is dependent upon the sustained and ener-
ested, perfectly rational, or even internally consistent. It is enough that they have been 
arrived at by means of an appropriate and rational process. The "Three Sisters Bridge 
Case," D.C. Federation of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972), appears to impose requirements that may be ap• 
propriate for judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings but are quite out of keeping with the 
nature of the decision-making there involved. 
76. See generally Cramton, The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Par-
ticipation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 525-30 (1972). 
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getic efforts of administrators. The courts cannot perform such 
functions. 
Environmentalists should remember that freewheeling judicial 
review, like the NEPA requirements themselves, is a two-edged 
sword. Industry representatives desiring to preserve a status quo 
favorable to their continued exploitation of natural resources may 
bring their own suits to restrain and delay governmental actions, 
relying on precedents set in the victories of the environmentalists. 
In National Helium Corp. v. Morton71 an industry group utilized 
NEPA to block a Department of the Interior action that would have 
terminated helium leases. NEPA has also been used to make broad 
attacks on the EPA regulatory program for implementing the Clean 
Air Act,78 and the Corps of Engineers' discharge permit program 
under the Refuse Act. 79 While the challenge to the Refuse Act per-
mit system has become academic as a result of provisions in the 1972 
Water Pollution Control Amendments transferring these functions 
to the EPA and exempting them from NEPA, 80 there are still many 
areas in which NEPA can be used to delay environmental protection 
as well as to enforce it. And it might well be asked why it was 
thought necessary to exempt the EPA from the requirements of the 
Act. Certainly the decisions of this agency have a more direct and 
immediate effect on the environment than the actions of most other 
sectors of government, and it possesses environmental expertise far 
beyond that available to other agencies. Nor can it be a sufficient 
answer to say that the EPA should be exempted because its primary 
77. 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1971). 
78. In Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), the court 
rejected a NEPA challenge to a compliance order issued by the Administrator of the 
EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970). The court assumed 
without deciding that NEPA applied to EPA approval of a state implementation plan, 
but concluded that the claim of noncompliance with NEPA in approving the plan 
could not be raised by attacking the compliance order. In addition, the court noted that 
the Administrator had no discretion to waive the standards for sulphur content of fuel 
established by statute, and that compliance with the impact statement requirement of 
NEPA in exercising prosecutorial discretion whether to institute enforcement proceed-
ings "would unnecessarily impede effective enforcement of the Clean Air Act." 342 
F. Supp. at 1022. 
See also 1972 ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 255: 
In at least three cases, representatives of the cement, chemicals, and electric 
power industries have challenged EPA's regulations limiting air pollution emis-
sions from new industrial plants. The companies argue that the regulations are 
major Federal actions that significantly affect the environment; therefore 102 
statements are required •••• [R]egardless of how [these cases are] resolved, business 
can be expected to challenge other regulatory actions of the Government. 
One court has held that the EPA is required to issue an environmental impact state-
ment in promulgating air pollution regulations. See Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1972, at 7, 
col. I. 
79. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971). 
80, Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 402(a)(4), 5Il(c)(2), added by Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816. 
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mission is to protect the environment. The law neither requires nor 
expects the EPA to give single-minded devotion to environmental 
considerations. Many decisions confronting the EPA in the water pol-
lution field involve trade-offs between environmental and economic 
values where broad input is desirable, and a variety of pressures will 
be felt by the regulators. If one regards the NEPA impact statement 
procedure as truly workable and efficient, there appears to be no 
substantial reason for exempting the agency that is most concerned 
with environmental problems. 
One detects in the desire of some environmental groups for an 
ever broader scope of judicial review under NEPA a deep suspicion 
of the intentions and capabilities of government. This suspicion is 
understandable and by no means baseless, but the environmental 
problems we face today cannot be dealt with by governmental im-
mobility and inaction. Affirmative programs are required. A proper 
concern with unleashing the motive power of government to regu-
late industry and natural resources supports the conclusion that the 
brake of judicial review should not be too easily or too strongly ap-
plied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
NEPA has been a force for constructive change in the federal 
government. Its action-forcing character, which has served to institu-
tionalize new inputs and perspectives, has made federal agencies 
more sensitive to environmental considerations and nudged them 
toward a decision-making process that embraces a broader spectrum 
of values. It is hoped that federal agencies will seize the opportunity 
for improved decision-making that NEPA has thrust upon them. In 
areas such as transportation and energy, where national policy is 
confused in content and diffused in administration, the President 
and Congress will need to rethink fundamental questions and ex-
amine a broad range of regulatory alternatives. In the meantime, 
reviewing courts should accord individual agencies, each of which 
has only limited capacity to weigh competing values or to consider 
broad alternatives, a substantial degree of discretion in the scope, 
timing, and manner in which alternatives are examined and policies 
reconsidered. NEPA should not be viewed as requiring that the 
processes of government come to a standstill until all first principles 
are re-examined. NEPA is a constant pressure in the right direction, 
but it cannot in itself provide the organizational structure or the 
intelligence and judgment that are prerequisites for needed change. 
You can lead a horse to water, but .... 
